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Method as the Embodiment of Reason
by Bryan Crable
Department of Communication, Purdue University

The introductory ideas
Through [the writing of laws on the body by modern discourses], living
beings are 'packed into a text' (in the sense that products are canned or
packed), transfonned into signifiers of rules (a sort of 'intextuation') an~
on the other hand, the reason or Logos of a society 'becomes flesh' (an
incarnation). (de Certeau 140)
I begin with a quote from Michel de Certeau's The Practice of Everyday Life,
because this quote describes the point at which I want to enter the debate on the
topic at hand, Reason. 1 I want (through this quote) to identify the focus of this essay: the intersection between body, society, and the Logos. I believe that the discourses of Reason function today simultaneously to subject the individual body to
their laws and to cause the individual body to assist in the reproduction of these
laws. Therefore, I address within this essay how the constraints of societal discourse function to "make Reason flesh," in the process preventing "the flesh" (the
everyday practices of our lives) from becoming incorporated into Reason.
This is not to suggest that we, as the bodies in this situation, are doomed merely
to fulfill the demands of an anonymous discourse. As de Certeau argues, the closed
circle described by this relationship between societal discourse and individual can
be-and continually is-broken. This breaking through/away from such societal
discourse does not, though, occur through political activism, nor does it find its
basis in political theory. This individual movement away from the discourses of
Reason is, instead, enacted in our everyday lives. De Certeau shows how we,, as
individuals are not passive consumers of the world around us. We are, rather, active

1

I also want to begin with an acknowledgment: I am indebted to Edward Schiappa,
Calvin Schrag, William Rawlins, Myrdene Anderson, and an outside reviewer for
their many instructive comments about earlier versions of this essay.
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participants in a world. In our daily activities of walking, cooking, telling stories,

might find within myself: or perhaps in the book of nature" (8). For Descartes, what

we appropriate and reinscribe: we individualize society, make it our own and can, in
the process, change it. It is in this spirit that I offer the following essay; as an ap-

separates his quest for knowledge about the world from those of others is not the

method, and as a reinscription and redescription of what we mean by "method." As

scholar conducting it; rather, it is the method employed in the inquiry. He notes that
"differences of opinion are not due to differences in intelligence, but merely to the
fact that we use different approaches and consider different things . . . . [T]hose

I write these words on Reason, I write about the laws/words/assumptions that I have

who walk slowly can, if they follow the right path, go much farther than those who

inherited, and, at the same time, create an alternative conception of method, an alternative space for my own research.

run rapidly in the wrong direction" (4 ).

propriation of one aspect of the modernist legacy, that of traditional notions of

For Descartes, therefore, a correct understanding of reality involves a striving to
Use of the tenn "research" might be taken to signify "academic" writings, and

find and follow the correct path. Indeed, Descartes notes that he spent much time

thus distinguish them from "non-academic" work. However, my use of the tenn

preparing for his inquiry into the truth of reality by "seeking the true method of

implies no such distinction. I want to break down the distinction invoked between
"academic" and "non-academic" discourses, and move toward the study of everyday

obtaining knowledge of everything which my mind was capable of understanding"

experiences and actions. I argue that a redefinition of "method" is one way in which

(14). Since he feared the obscuring of his results through the influence of prejudgments and preconceptions, he resolved to eliminate everything from his reasoning

such a move can be made. Within the boundaries of this essay, therefore, I turn to
the world of academia and discuss the ways in which the legacies of Reason sepa-

"unless it presented itself so clearly and distinctly to my mind that there was no
reason or occasion to doubt it" ( 15). Rationality for Descartes was achieved through

rate everyday activities from "methodical" activities. In the second half of the essay,

discovery and application of a correct method-moving forward from ideas that
appeared clear and distinct, moving from evident truths to further truths. In this
way, Descartes hoped to shut off his own preconceptions and speak the language of
reality. He hoped to achieve this by establishing rules for himself in advance,

I consider an alternative way to view "method," in the hopes that such a redefinition
can open up the discourses of academia to allow consideration of different ways of
engaging the world, an embrace of the many different practices of everyday life. I
take for my organizing principle two related meanings of the following phrase:
method as the embodiment of reason.

"ma[king] a finn and unalterable resolution not to violate them even in a single
instance" (15).

By devotedly following these rules, by "conducting all [his]

thoughts according to [the method's] rules" (22), Descartes argued that he could
ensure the validity of his results. He argued that he could sort out the questionable

Method as embodiment of reason (pt. I):
"method" as a source of legitimacy
As a participant in academia, I have found that one of the more important and
ubiquitous legacies of Enlightenment Reason is the notion of "method." Tradi-

tionally, research in social science (not to mention natural science) has relied a great
deal upon the articulation and application of proper methods. This reliance is based
upon a conception of "method" as an instrument that, when used properly by the

prejudices from acceptable truths.
For Descartes, therefore, knowledge about the truth of reality came from the deduction of truths from truths according to an explicit set of rules. His method, his
rules or criteria laid down in advance, ensured that he would not allow his own
prejudgments to influence his conclusions. Indeed, according to Descartes, "I began
with the most simple and general, and each truth that I found was a rule which

found in Descartes' "Discourse on Method," where he explicitly creates linkages
between Reason and method.

helped me to find others, so that I not only solved many problems which 1 had previously judged very difficult, but also it seemed to me that toward the end I could
detennine to what extent a still unsolved problem could be solved, and what proce-

Descartes argues that the goal of his research has always been "to distinguish

dures should be used in solving it" (17). Therefore, Reasoned inquiry became a
matter of rule-following based upon clear and distinct ideas. Reason became a

scholar, yields valid results. One origin of this conception of "method" can be

truth from falsehood, so that I could make intelligent decisions about the affairs of
this life and act with greater confidence" (9). In order to achieve this goal, Descartes writes that he detennined to "seek no other knowledge than that which I
disC/osure: REASON INCorporated

matter of eliminating via method all thoughts that do not correspond to the truth of
nature. Descartes believed that he had found a method that enabled him to validly
reason about subjects in all areas of inquiry. He believed that he had discovered
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the correct path, the correct method for rationally determining truth from falsity

"following a way." It appears in Aristotle's On Rhetoric, where Aristotle defines

( 17). Thus, for Descartes, the methodical scholar became the epitome (or embodiment) of Reason in inquiry.

"method" (in the context of rhetoric)

as answering "how and from what sources we

may reach our objective" (1.1.14). When "method" is tied to the directive notion of
moving along a "path" or "way," it becomes easy to see the necessity of finding the

Indeed, Reason and method are still linked in this way today. An illustration:

right path. If we are using an "improper method" or no method at all, we find our-

when I entered graduate school and turned my focus to rhetorical criticism, I was

selves traveling upon a path that does not go in the desired direction. Thus, in order

not just turned loose with a word processor and a text to examine. Rather, I was

to reach the destination of our choice, we need the right method.

trained. Trained, that is, in the methods of analysis proper to this field. As one
author of a basic textbook on rhetorical method writes, "we engage in the process of

Our method, then, becomes a sort of guarantee: if we use the right method, we

rhetorical criticism constantly and often unconsciously, but with some formal train-

will find what we are looking for. For example, when interpreting a text, we need to

ing, we can become more adept and discriminating in its practice" (Foss 3). This, I

choose a method that will reveal the secrets we seek in the text. If I want, therefore,

suggest, is a very common experience for those of us in academia-but it is pre-

to uncover the motives that are inherent in the situation presented in John Barth's

cisely the experience that reinforces and recreates the distinction between the activities we normally engage in and "methodical" practices.

novel The Floating Opera, I tum to Kenneth Burke's pentad. The assumption here
is that the pentad gives me access to the text such that I can see a character's motives

as they really are in the text. Finding the right method consequently can be seen as
This is not to say, however, that such an experience is limited to those of us in

securing an epistemological guarantee. A method is like a conveyer belt; if I get on

academia. In everyday life, we can easily see such the status accorded "methodical"

the right one, it takes me to my destination. This assumption is evident in Descartes'

activities. For example, in the realm of music, there are books and videos for the

text; he argued that he was able to solve difficult problems and arrive at certain truth

beginner labeled guitar or piano "method." Smokers also can find programs that

because he had found the right method. As a rhetorical critic, the right method

teach the "proven method" to stop smoking; other advertisers during daytime tele-

similarly allows me to state definitively what a text means by providing me access to

vision frequently claim that their product is "more effective than any other weight-

the text as it really is.

loss method." Although I am going to restrict my focus to the realm of academia in
this essay, it is clear that "method" enjoys a privileged status in both "academic" and

However, in order to reach the truth of the text, I need to be able to distinguish

"non-academic" discourses. This privilege enjoyed by method is, I believe, derived
from the identification of Reason with method.

what I see in the text from what is really there. In other words, I need to be able to
make sure that my analysis is not skewed by my own preconceptions. This introduces the second assumption of "method"

as traditionally defined. A method en-

Due to the equation of Reason with method, any activity that does not qualify as

ables us, according to Descartes, to eliminate any of our biases that might affect our

"methodical" is, by definition, irrational-and is delegitimized automatically. The

results because it involves adhering to criteria and rules that are specified in ad-

traditional conception of "method," therefore, marks a division between those prac-

vance. We can ensure that we are following the correct path because we can match

tices that are conducted under the auspices of Reason and those that are not. Such a

our procedure against the steps of the method. In determining the motives in The

distinction, I believe, functions to prevent many everyday practices of our lives from

Floating Opera, I will know that I am on the right track because I can make sure

as legitimate, rational analyses of the world. I argue that there are
three interrelated assumptions that set activities traditionally defined as
"methodical" apart from those seen as "non-methodical": a method is a path leading

that I follow a few simple steps. I first identify the protagonists in the dramatic

to a desired goal, a method follows rules established in advance, and a method exists separately from the critic.

these steps of the pentad will quite naturally lead to my discovery of the motives

First of all, a "method" is a path that leads to a particular destination. Indeed,

One important thing should be. noted about the rules that are followed. The

"method" is derived from the Greek term methodos, meaning" following a road" or

rules of the method are established in advance-they are not derived from my en-

being considered

disClosure: REASON INCorporated

situation of the novel: the agent, the act, the agency, the scene, and the purpose.
Finally, I examine the ratios that are inherent between any two terms. Following
inherent in the text.
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counter with Barth's text. This is because, as Descartes argued, antecedently specifying the rules to be followed prevents one's preconceptions from influencing the

make assertions about the things that are outside ourselves. However, we might be
mistaken in our assertions; we might not be seeing the world in its objectivity. In

results. The method is derived prior to its application, so that using the method
requires merely measuring the object of study against the method's criteria. This

other words, our subjectivities might color what we see. Therefore, we check our

means that the object of study is not analyzed according to the impressions that I
receive from it, impressions that might be mistaken. Rather it is evaluated using

subjectivity. We can thus attempt to get as close as possible to the objective world

rules that have already proven true. Thus, biases are neutralized because the
evaluation of the object of study is performed not by any individual person (who
may be prejudiced or deceived), but by the method, which is the voice of truth.

assertions against the assertions of others, combining our subjectivities into an interby achieving intersubjectivity.
I argue that this is where "method" enters the picture. The traditional conception of method functions to assist the achievement of intersubjectivity because it
allows for replication. "Method" is separate from the person using it; therefore, in
this view, method acts as a sort of guarantee that my findings correspond to The

In my analysis of The Floating Opera, therefore, I will know that I have determined the motive as it really is given in the text because I did not discover my procedure in the text itself Rather, the pentad has already proved valid as a method to

Floating Opera. This is because anyone who is versed in the method that I am us-

establish motives in texts. I will, therefore, know that what I find in the text is really

I have followed in my analysis of the text. This person, then, can compare the re-

there because I am not finding anything in the text; the pentad is doing the finding.
The antecedently-established rules thus eliminate possible bias and, therefore, guarantee that following the right method leads to the desired result

sults that he or she achieves with my own; they should be compatible. The interpretive community to which I (and my research) belong can work together to

Implied in the above discussion is the final assumption of "method" as traditionally defined: method is separate from the person using that method. What this

Therefore, because "method" is assumed to be something that I use and not
something that is a part of me, I can use the same method that Kenneth Burke used.

means is that a method is seen as something that exists independently of the person
using the method. Method is neither a part nor an attribute of the critic; it is something that aids the critic in his or her analyses. Method is applied or utilized, created or revised. It is an instrument, something that can be taught in a textbook or a
class on method. There is, therefore, a distance between the scholar and the method

Other people can use the same method that I use. Furthermore, I can use the same
method repeatedly over time. It does not matter if the person using the method

that he or she uses-the two are not coextensive. When I examine The Floating
Opera using the pentad, there is a difference me and the tool that I use on the text,
the system that I apply to the text, the lens through which I look at the text.
This assumption is based upon a traditional distinction between subjectivity and
objectivity. In this view, there is a difference between what I experience as inside
myself and what I experience as outside myself My "inside" is myself as a subjectivity; that outside me is experienced as objectivity. I am separate from the rock that
I trip over; I am not the same as the text that I study; my neighbor and I are distinctly different. I am separate from my method just as I am separate from all of
these.
My neighbor and I are both subjectivities, and we both confront an objective
world, a world that is "out there." Finding ourselves in this situation, we can both

disC/osure: REASON JNCorporated

ing can "check my work." Any such person can merely replicate the procedure that

"correct" any subjective biases that might slip into my analysis.

changes, because the method itself is the same-and, thus, the results obtained
should be the same. It is in this way that method guarantees intersubjectivity;
method is common property, not unique to a particular individual. This, I believe,
is what is implied by Descartes when he notes that the only difference between himself (who could reach the truth about reality and solve difficult problems) and others
was the method used.
In this view, the important part of rationality lies in the method itself; the person
using the method is secondary. What sets apart Descartes' research is not Descartes
himself: rather it is the method that he used. According to Descartes, others can use
'
this method to the same effect. Differences between people, therefore, are eliminated from the rational process of engaging in a methodical analysis. A proper
method works to circumscribe the individuality of the person conducting the research. The method allows us to talk about how our research results correspond to
the way things really are, they allow us to show how our results can be applied beyond our own experience. Method~ in this respect, guarantees that the research has
meaning outside of an individual body at a particular time in a particular situation.
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retains the ability to guide our interactions in our socio-historical situation. As
Schrag argues, "our proposal is that reason is operative in and through the transversal play of discourse and action, word and deed, speaking and writing, hearing and
reading, in the guise of three phases of communicative praxis: ( 1) discerning and
evaluating critique; (2) interactive articulation; and (3) incursive disclosure"

Method as embodiment of reason (pt. 2):

(Resources 9). In short, transversal rationality, as a form of communicative praxis,
is inevitably bound up with the various interactions, experiences, activities, and

locating reason and method in everyday activities
The problem that I have with the traditional definition of "method" articulated in

projects that make up our lives as human beings (Resources 9). Throughout the rest

the. ~r~vious section lies in the exclusionary function that this definition plays: all

of this essay, I attempt to develop an alternative description of "method," one that

ac:1v1ties ~at do not qualify as "methodical" also do not qualify as rational. Thus,

expands the range of what counts as a rational analysis in academia This project is

de~t1on of "method" limits what is admissible as a rational analysis within
aca_ct~Illla Th~ implication is that many everyday activities, activities that may be
l~gitimate and interesting ways of knowing the world, are excluded from considera-

necessarily intertwined with Schrag's, but it is more limited in scope. It should be

tio.n.. Indeed, as Calvin Schrag notes, this excludes such activities as poetry and

Schrag provides in his text.

this

pamtmg from counting as rational analyses of our world (Resources 54).

noted, however, that my use of the term "rational" or "reason" in conjunction with
my redefinition of "method" is referring to the expanded notion of rationality that
4

How,

then, do we account for Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of Cezanne as a phe-

As I noted above, critiquing the traditional way that "method" has been concep-

nomenologist?2 How do we evaluate Alfred Schutz's argument that Mozart was a

tualized does not necessitate a jettisoning of the concept of method altogether. We

better philosopher than any philosopher of his time?3 The conceptualiz.ation of

can try to formulate new descriptions of what it means to "have a method." The

method that I described in the previous section would reject the activities of both

redefinition that I attempt in the following pages begins first with a critique of the

Cezanne ~d. Mozart as irrational or "non-rational." I argue, instead, that there are
many act1v1t1es such as painting, making music, cooking, and walking may have

three assumptions identified in the last section as implicit in traditional "method." I

much to tell us about the world around us, and thus should be considered rational
analyses of our world.

"method" might have in the realm of academia

then conclude with a brief discussion of what implications this expanded notion of

First of all, traditional notions of "method" assume that following a method
Does this mean that we must reject the notion of "method" altogether in order to

leads to the desired goal. "Method," then, becomes sort of a talisman; finding the

broaden notions of rationality? Do we need a new term to replace "method" in the

right path means that one will end up at the destination of one's choice. Such an

equation of ~eason and method? Although that is one possible strategy, I believe

assumption means that applying the pentad to Barth's text leads necessarily to an

that we can instead engage in a reconceptualiz.ation of what we mean by "method. 11

understanding of the motives implicit in the novel, that use of Burke's method gives

Such.~ redefini~ion of "method," in conjunction with and based upon Schrag's re~efimtion of ration~ity, would allow us to broaden our discussion of rationality to

me unmediated access to the reality of the text. However, the problem with such an

include the many different activities that illustrate the many different ways to engage
the world around us.

from how things really are, that we can move past changing appearances to get at

assertion is that it assumes that we can use a method to separate how we see things
unchanging natures.

In The Resources of Rationality, Schrag attempts a refiguration of rationality,
one that moves away from the "despised Logos" of the Enlightenment, but one that
4

: This refers to Merleau-Ponty's wonderful essay, "Cezanne's Doubt."
This refers to Schutz's essay, "Mozart and the Philosophers."

disClosure: REASON INCorporated

Do I therefore accept the equation between Reason and method? I believe that the
two are necessarily intertwined: an expanded notion of "method" must be based
upon a similarly expanded notion of what it means to be rational. However, I do not
mean to reduce this rationality to this notion of "method." I would argue, with
Schrag, that redefining "method" is, instead, one part of a redefinition of rationality.
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This assertion is problematic because, as Richard Rorty argues, use of a method

with reality through use of a method, it could be argued that we would not need to

cannot remove us from our position within human reality. A view of unchanging

follow a set of rules drawn up ahead of time. However, there is a further problem

natures cannot be achieved unless we can somehow step outside of our participation

with the idea of a priori criteria. As Schrag argues, when we detennine our criteria

in human communities and human language. We would have to have a "God's-eye

in advance, we do not (as Descartes believed) avoid biasing our encounter with the

view." I argue that we cannot achieve such a standpoint, and that a method, as de-

object of study. Instead, the reverse happens: we skew our results. We detennine in

veloped and expressed in human language, will bring us no closer to such a view.

advance what we will find.

The key point of the argument is that we are dealing with language when we
"represent" reality: "you cannot check a sentence against an object . . . You can

As Schrag argues, the use of a priori criteria determines our results in advance

only check a sentence against other sentences, sentences to which it is connected by

because stating our criteria in advance also creates a justification for one's results in

various labyrinthine inferential relationships" (Rorty I 00). We do not have direct,

advance. Thus, the reasons that the findings of the inquiry are "correct" are the

unmediated contact with absolute reality. We compare our assertions to other linguistic representations-not a picture of reality as it "really is."

same as the criteria stipulated at the beginning of the project (Schrag, Resources
54). In other words, stating what one is looking for prior to the encounter with the
text both determines what one is going to find and justifies those findings ahead of

This rejection of the "God's-eye view" means that we cannot discover the es-

time. A clear example would be if: as a part of my reading of The Floating Opera,

sence or nature of reality and separate this out from the other properties that we, or

consulted two critics' texts on the novel, two texts that offered competing interpre-

our language, ascribe to them. It is problematic, therefore, to view using a method

tations of a particular chapter. Ifl dete~e my critera ahead of time, stating "I will

as "cracking codes, peeling away accidents to reveal essence, stripping away veils of

use the text that offers an explanation for a greater amount of the text," I will de-

appearance to reveal reality" (Rorty 89). Indeed, I argue that we can "talk about"

tennine the text I will select ahead of time as well. Moreover, I will have already

the marks on a page of Barth's novel, but that we cannot link our discussions of a

provided myself with a reason for the choice. Similarly, stating the rules of the

text to the text as it "really is." As Rorty argues, this problematizes "the idea that

method in advance means that I will detennine what I will find in the text before I

the text can tell you something about what it wants, rather than simply providing

even begin analyzing it.

stimuli which make it relatively hard or relatively easy to convince yourself or others of what you were initially inclined to say about it" (I 03 ).

This does not mean, however, that we must throw out all notions of criteria altogether. Indeed, as Schrag notes, we can merely reject the notion of a priori crite-

The text, like nature, cannot tell us what to think or say about it, it can just cause

ria Such a rejection attempts to capture the spirit of "discernment" that was origi-

us to hold beliefs. I argue, then, that "reading texts is a matter of reading them in the

nally in the root of the tenn "critiera." This spirit operates in what Schrag terms

light of other texts, people, obsessions, bits of infonnation, or what have you and

praxial critique, "a discernment that draws upon the wider functions and faculties of

then seeing what happens" (Rorty I 05). In this view of analyzing texts, I do not

the soul in its response to the social practices that extend transversally across the

apply a method to a text in order to discover a bit of truth about the text as it is in
reality. I cannot achieve a view of the text as it is in reality. Rather, I engage in a

polis, providing at once an assessment of these practices and criteria for decision
and action" (Resources 60). Schrag notes that, in praxial critique, we use criteria

reading of the text based upon my own predispositions, beliefs, favorite authors, and

that are not specified in advance when reacting to a text or making a decision.

habits of action. Thus, I might read Barth in light of my reading of Jacques Derrida;

These critiera are instead derived from such elements as our experiences, our be-

similarly, I might read Barth based upon my own experiments with creative writing.

liefs, our involvement in a particular community, and our language (Schrag, Re-

Such a type of reading is less an attempt to reach the essence of a text than an activity engaged in by an individual in response to a text.

sources 64). They are predispositions that are activated in some combination in
particular cases-and allow us to make decisions based upon those predispositions
(Schrag, Resources 60).

This shift in the stated goal of analysis problematizes the second assumption
underlying traditional conceptions of "method": following a method entails follow-

Thus, praxial critique is a notion that allows us to problematize the notion of

ing rules laid out in advance. If we reject the notion that we can achieve a contact

criteria specified in advance, but does not deny the possibility of a rational scholarly
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research. In my encounter with The Floating Opera, I am already laden with experiences, preferences, prejudices, and beliefs that aJready orient me to the world (and

make . . . changes in an apartment they furnish with their acts and memories" (xxi).

to the novel itself) in some way. Criteria for the decision are then already a part of

Therefore, individuaJs essentially engage in improvisation, appropriating but

me. The encounter with the text, however, might cause one or more to become

changing an existing discourse. The result, according to de Certeau, is a creative

relevant in my reaction to and analysis of the situation. My favorite film might be-

consumption: "Barthes reads Proust in Stendhal's text; the viewer reads the land-

come relevant in my reading of Barth's text; similarly, my reading of the text might

scape of his childhood in the evening news" (xxi). Therefore, we can argue that it is

caJl to mind my fascination with old-fashioned steamboats.

impossible to consider a method apart from the uses to which particular people put

Indeed, Kenneth

Burke's texts may even come to mind. In this case, Burke's discussion of motives

courses, like apartments, are individualized by those who inhabit them: "renters

it (xiii).

may guide my reading of Barth's novel, without turning into a recipe that I must
state ahead of time and strictly follow. In this view, I would be engaged in an

In our redefinition of "method," therefore, we find that we cannot separate the

analysis based upon discerned rules, not an attempt to achieve the reality of the text
through following a priori rules.

scholar from his or her method. Each scholar personalizes a particular method in
the particular uses to which the method is put, the connections that are drawn between this particular method and another item in the scholar's experience, as well as

In this redefinition of "method," thus, the rules or criteria used in the analysis

the motives that make that particular method relevant to the scholar. It is in the

arise from the predispositions of an individual as they become relevant in the en-

analysis, then, that these differences become evident-the scholar's creativity is

counter with the object of study. This implies a rejection of the third assumption

shown in his or her improvisation upon the themes of the method. It is in this sense

underlying traditional assumptions of "method": a method is separate from the per-

that we can problematize the notion that two people can use the "same" method, or

son using it. In the arguments provided above concerning the first two traditional

that one person at different times uses the "same" method. In both of these in-

assumptions of "method," we have moved toward a more individualized conception

stances, we are not describing the "same" method: the method will vary between

of method. Insofar as we both move away from viewing method as a path to truth

each situation because it will be individualized.

and associate the rules or criteria of a method with the preconceptions of the
scholar, we move toward an association of the method itself with the individuality
of the scholar.

For example, the Burkean pentad, as it appears in my analysis of The Floating

a method such as the pentad) is always individualized by those who are the consum-

Opera , will differ from the pentad as it appears in Kenneth Burke's own writings.
Moreover, the pentad in my analysis will differ from the pentad as it would appear
in a colleague's analysis of Barth's novel. Indeed, the pentad in my present analysis
will differ from the pentad as it would appear in my analysis of the same text twenty
years from now. The difference between the methods involved in each of these

ers of such discourse. Thus, we might argue that it is quite possible (and, indeed,

situations lies in the personalized character of the method in each situation. The

certain) that the hegemonic method is personalized by the idiosyncrasies of the

methods used in each case are not the same because they inevitably reflect individ-

scholar engaged in an analysis. As de Certeau argues in the case of reading a text,

ual differences between the people using the method. Thus, we do not apply a pre-

the individual reader "invents in texts something different from what they 'intended.'

existing instrument to a text. A method, instead, becomes a part of us when we

He [or she] detaches them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He [or she] com-

appropriate it. Insofar as method is individualized, we cannot eliminate individual

bines their fragments and creates something un-known in the space organized by
their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meaning" (169).

differences from the picture when we discuss issues of method.

Such an individualized description of method is suggested by de Certeau's text
as well. The main thesis of de Certeau's text is that societal discourse (for example,

In this redefinition of "method," we describe method as necessarily bound up
In the case of method, then, our analyses are personalized by the use to which

with such things as the individual researcher's experiences, committnents, and be-

we put any particular method, the connections that we make between any particular

liefs. We might argue, therefore, that a research article displays the results of what

method and any other part of our experience. De Certeau might illustrate this per-

happened when a particular researcher (with the aforementioned set of beliefs,

sonalization of method by comparing it to renting an apartment. He notes that dis-

commitments, and motivations) encountered a particular person or aspect of the
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world .. Thus, this redescription of "method" emphasizes the creative aspect of consumption. ~at de Certeau describes. What becomes important in engaging in such
an analysis is ~e result of the encounter between the scholar and the object of study.

Indeed, we s~1ft our focus from the details of the method that was used to the results

of the ~alys1s. We move from concern with replication of the researcher's results to
the particular connections that are drawn by the scholar, the beli·ec.s
·
J.: or expenences
that become relevant in the encounter, the uses to which texts are put.

Doe~' this, ~owever, sacrifice the intersubjectivity that traditional conceptions of

11
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language. Indeed, Schrag argues that we cannot separate "inner" subjectivity from
"outer" objectivity because, in the process of communication, the subjective and the
objective, the "I" and the "you" emerge in a mutual process of constitution:
the indexical posture of 'I' is dialectically bonded with the posture of
'you' as the one being addressed. I as speaker emerge in the presence of
you as hearer .
. I am able to say 'I' only because of an
acknowledgment of you as my interlocutor within the dynamics of the
dialogic encounter. The 'I' and the 'you' are as it were coconstituted,
sharing a common, intersubjective space. (Communicative 125)

method provided by separating researcher and method? I argue that this is onl
th
·f
·
Y
. e ~ase I we continue to base our conception of "method" upon a traditional dis-

Therefore, I agree with Schrag that no speaker "is an island, entire of itself'

tinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Traditional assumptions discussed in

(Communicative 125).

~~ previous section, i.e. method as separate from the critic or determination of vahdi~ through application of a priori criteria, function to prevent individual precon-

Moreoever, an individual's intended meaning in his or her expressive discourse

ceptions from biasing the results of the analysis. They therefore ensure that the

and/or action is also subject to interpretation by the individual's audience, and

results have a meaning that goes beyond the subjective experience of the particular

therefore expression can have public, intersubjectively-created meaning as well as

res~~cher. In other words, they function as intersubjective "checks" to ensure the

an individual's private, intended meaning (Schrag, Communicative 40). Thus, this

val1d1ty of the critic's analysis.

problematizes the traditional distinctions made in discussion of "method" between
inner and outer, public and private, subjective precoception and significant mean-

bel~eve that the effort to maintain intersubjective "checks" on the subjectivity
of rheton~al crit~c.ism is based upon a problematic view of subjectivity. As Schrag
~gues, this ~1t1onal, centered view of subjectivity trades heavily upon distinc~ons between. inner and outer, expression and meaning, private and public. TradiI

ing. I agree with Schrag that a conception of subjectivity based upon such distinctions needs to be replaced with a conception of subjectivity that encompasses both
halves of the traditional dichotomy. This new conception of subjectivity is offered
by Schrag as one in which "the articulated meanings of individual speech acts and

tional conceptions of subjectivity privilege one half of the binary to the detriment of

gestures are at once displays of the intentions of particular speakers and the inscrip-

~e other. . ~e
und~rstandm~ as

tions of sense in the history of publicly spoken language" (Communicative 47).

notes that such a conception of subjectivity associates

what goes on within people (and, therefore, has a subjective
meanmg), whtle "explanation" concerns "external and objective states of affairs"

(Comm~nic.ative

~is distinction, therefore,
that which IS so.lely mean~gful to one individual.

One implication of the blurring of the distinction between "inner" and "outer" in

separates subjective meaning as

our definition of "method" is that the individual scholar's voice becomes more im-

Subjectivity, in this view, needs

portant in his or her own method. This emphasis upon the voice is similar to that

to be corrected m methodical research by intersubjective "checks" to ensure that the

called for by Susan Krieger in Social Science and the Self. In this text, Krieger

results are not merely meaningful to one person. However, I argue that we cannot

proposes that "we ought to develop our own different individual perspectives more

make such a clean separation between subjective and objective meaning.

fully in social science, and we ought to acknowledge, more honestly than we do, the

76).

extent to which our studies are reflections of our inner lives" ( 1). Krieger argues

Schr~g writes, "expressive" statements are not merely "the articulation of
~n.va~ m~anmg b~ an autonomous speaker"; they always reveal the speaker's par-

our personal experiences as bodies living in and through the world (29). Thus, ac-

ticipation m a particular linguistic community (Communicative 36)

cording to Krieger, we should acknowledge that "the self is not a contaminant, but

. As

Therefore a

that we are directly affected (and, conversely, our research is directly affected) by

~tic's "subjective ~xpression" always implies familiarity with the .intersubject;ve
histo~ an~ co~ventions of a particular language. A scholar's discourse always al-

fruitfully be revised to acknowledge the involvement of the self in a positive man-

ready unphes mtersubjective agreement, at least at the level of spoken and written

ner" (30).
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Indeed, my redefinition of "method" would allow us also to engage in such a
reconceptualization of the relationship between scholar and his or her object of
research. Rather than seeing the two as separate (or as separable), we would argue
that continuing the processes of interpretation and reinterpretation would allow us
to talk in meaningful ways about our experiences of ourselves, other people, and the
world that we live in. In this redescription, we, as scholars, would not try to eliminate our own voice in the research. Our voice, like the voices of others that we
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of the world of everyday life. We situate reason and rationality in the individual
bodies that make up societies, the bodies that interact and communicate in the production and interpretation of meaning. Therefore, we allow the work of individual
people/bodies such as novelists, journalists, musicians, painters, social activists, and
construction workers to be legitimate statements about the world that we live in.
Mozart and Cezanne, for example, can clearly be considered philosophers in such a
redefinition of "methodical" activity.

might interact with, is an important part of the ongoing dialogue. As Krieger writes,
she does not want to speak of herself "because I am generally applicable (like a
theory) or because I am an instance of a more widespread phenomenon (like a piece
of data), but because I am someone in particular" (34).

In the process, we can expand the typical focus on deduction and induction,
procedures that, some argue, do not function in the way that they are articulated in
traditional research.5 We can instead allow some space for method as abductive, a
creative "aha!" that shows the performative character of the individual's encounter

The final consequence of this redefinition of "method" refers to the exclusionary
function that notions of "method" typically perform. As I noted in the beginning of
the essay, traditional conceptions of method reinforce the conception that, insofar as
we use a method when talking about our world, we are "rational," and, insofar as we
are not trained in method or do not use one, we are engaged in "irrational" or "non-

with what he or she is studying. De-mystifying method, then, and situating it in the
"practices of everyday life" works to subvert one of the important barriers that separate academia from other people's lived experience. We then conceive of method as
(in a second, empowering sense) the embodiment of reason, and, thus, we work to
bring those of us in academia closer to that which we claim to be studying.

rational" research. A traditional notion of "method," therefore, erects "methodical"
activity as a privileged way to interpret the world. This is similar to a situation de
Certeau describes in terms of texts:
the use made of the text by privileged readers constitutes it as a secret of
which they are the 'true' interpreters. It interposes a frontier between the
te~ and its readers that can be crossed only if one has a passport
deh~ere.d by these o~cial interpreters, who transform their own reading
{which ts also a leg1t1mate one) into an orthodox 'literality' that makes
of!1er (equally. legitimate) readings either heretical (not 'in conformity'
with the meanmg of the text) or insignificant (to be forgotten). (171)
When, consequently, we redefine the idea of "method," we can open the realm of
"methodical" activity to practices heretofore excluded as "irrational." Therefore, the
many different ways of engaging with and responding to the world around us can
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Cu Itch
by Carol Denson

Chicago, Illinois

noun [origin uncertain] 1. rubbish. 2. the various materi~s, such as
shells, gravel, etc., out of which a spawning bed for oysters is made. 3.
the spawn of oysters.
from Webster's Unabridged Dictionary

The scandal lingers, rough baptismal ballast,
sounding a life,
naming a death. A way to begin: the gauze

an elegy lays
or rips, rusty impertinent threader. The hedge
protects but hides
a killer, rusing traveller rocking back
to center a sin,
the easy ignited flow cresting each hill,
the downhill denial,
speedy freedom, a quick blind friend.
The baobab cutters make paper, rope, eat the pulp
of the gourdlike fruit.
What change, barb erupted, skulks here?
What cultch
rides the barge downriver? Whose channel
might flow me
ballast for spawn, cracked rocks to gird my tracks,
a bed that holds,
sweet trash to steady, each wasted load
a gait that sees,
forgetting the story that clears the gazed path.
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